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ABSTRACT
We analyze and compare the impact of tax incentives and of introducing en-
hanced annuities on annuitization behavior considering heterogeneity among
the insured. We find that tax incentives for annuitization result in a significant
increase of the portion of people who should annuitize and also an increase of
the insurer’s profit since less healthy individuals also annuitize, i.e. adverse selec-
tion is reduced. However, the problem that different insured receive a different
value for money is even increased by tax incentives. If enhanced annuities are
introduced, the percentage of insured who should annuitize further increases.
Adverse selection is further reduced and the differences in value for money from
annuitizing shrink.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In many countries tax incentives exist for annuitizing benefits from an old age
provision contract. In Germany, for instance, since 2005 a strong tax incentive
has been introduced for annuitizing money that has been accumulated within
an insurance contract: if the benefit from an insurance contract is received as
a lump sum, then — depending on certain criteria — either 50% or 100% of
the difference between the lump sum benefits received and premiums paid (that
is, the capital gain) have to be taxed. If, however, the benefit is converted into a
lifelong annuity, then only the so-called taxable portion of each annuity is taxed.
The taxable portion is given in the German income tax law and depends only on
the insured’s age when the annuity payments start. For instance if the annuity
payments start at age 65, then 18% of each annuity payment has to be taxed
at the beneficiary’s individual income tax rate (the table of taxable portions is
given in Appendix A). This taxable portion is a rather rough and simplified ap-
proximation for the earnings after the annuity payments start, assuming, e.g.,
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that a fixed rate of interest of 3% is earned each year and that everybody lives
exactly to their life expectancy (cf. e.g. Richter and Ruß, 2002).1 For immediate
annuities, this means that taxes are paid on an approximation for the earnings
received from the policy. For deferred annuities, however, this means that es-
sentially all earnings from the accumulation phase are tax-free if the contract
is annuitized and only earnings after the start of the annuity phase are taxed.
Similar tax privileges for annuitization hold in many other countries, as well.
There are, of course, several reasons why the government may choose to pro-
vide tax incentives for annuitization. Primarily, such incentives are implemented
in order to encourage individuals to hedge against the risk of outliving their
money. Particularly at times where in many countries benefits from state funded
(pay-as-you-go) pension systems are being reduced, these incentives seem to be
necessary in order to stimulate demand.Whereas empirical studies seem to con-
firm that the money’s worth of an annuity in many situations is typically high
enough to make purchasing this product attractive for an individual (see, e.g.
Mitchell et al., 1999; James and Song, 2001), real world markets so far show
surprisingly little demand for annuities. Reasons for this, as discussed in the liter-
ature, include adverse selection (see for instance Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004),
bequest motives (see e.g. Bernheim, 1991), precautionary savings for compen-
sating income risk by factors such as health problems (see Strawczynski, 1999),
and inner-family risk-sharing (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981).
Whilst tax Incentives can stimulate demand for annuities, they can also cre-
ate undesired effects in markets where only standard annuities (and no substan-
dard annuities, such as enhanced or impaired annuities2) exist. In standard an-
nuities, annuity providers use average mortality rates to determine the annuity
that will be paid out for a given premium. Thus, the ratio of invested premium
and lifelong annuity depends only on age and gender but not on the individ-
ual health condition of the insured. Therefore, an annuity contract that may
be priced at an actuarially fair rate for an average individual may be rather
unattractive for a person with certainmedical impairments and rather attractive
for a very healthy person. As a consequence, such standard annuities provide a
good value for money only for people with at or above average life expectancy.
With enhanced or impaired annuities, insurers attempt to offer the same value
for money to all clients: At the start of the contract for immediate annuities or
at the end of the accumulation period for deferred annuities, the condition of
the insured is assessed e.g. by some form of individual underwriting. The under-
writing results are converted into individual mortality probabilities that are then
used for pricing the annuity contract. Thus, the resulting annuity payment is the
higher, the shorter the life insurer’s estimate for the insured’s life expectancy.
In the absence of both, tax incentives for annuitization and enhanced annu-
ities, the majority of people with below average life expectancy would choose
not to annuitize their contract at the end of the deferment period. This is also
consistent with two observations made in many insurance markets: Observed
annuitization rates are rather low and people who do annuitize have significantly
lower mortality rates than people who don’t annuitize.
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In the presence of enhanced annuities, at least in theory (i.e. if the under-
writing is assumed to be “perfect”), everybody should receive the same value
for money when taking out an annuity. The decision whether or not to annuitize
should then be independent of the insured’s health. Tax incentives for annuitiza-
tion in a market with enhanced annuities should therefore significantly increase
the acceptance of annuities — for healthy as well as impaired.
If, however, tax incentives for annuitization do exist in a market where en-
hanced annuities are not being offered, then essentially a person with certain
medical impairments at the end of the accumulation period faces the following
dilemma: The insured can either receive a lump sum benefit which is not tax
efficient or annuitize the money which is tax efficient but comes at too high a
price given the individual state of health. In other words, a portion of the tax
benefit is implicitly taken away from an impaired person due to the poor value
for money of the annuity contract.
This paper analyzes the financial consequences of this situation from the per-
spective of both, the insured and the insurer and explores how the presence of
impaired annuities changes these consequences. We perform quantitative analy-
ses under the current German taxation rules but want to stress that the qualita-
tive results should be similar in all markets with tax incentives for annuitization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present
our model framework. In particular, we will specify heterogeneity among the
insured through a simple frailty model for the individual’s mortality. In this
model, a so called frailty factor describes the individual’s state of health. We
also introduce our model for underwriting, i.e. how the estimated frailty factor
(that is the result of the underwriting process) relates to the actual frailty factor
of an individual. Furthermore, we introduce the considered annuity products: a
standard annuity that does not depend on the individual’s state of health and an
enhanced annuity where this information is considered in the pricing. Finally,
we explain the considered tax regimes: the so-called “old” tax regime without
incentives for annuitization and the “new” tax regime, where such incentives
have been introduced.
In Section 3, we analyze— in amarket where only standard annuities exist—
under what circumstances annuitization is preferable from an individual’s point
of view depending on age, tax rate and the individual’s state of health. We intro-
duce the so-called critical frailty factor: If the insured’s individual frailty factor
is below the critical frailty factor, then annuitization is preferable. We analyze
for risk neutral and risk adverse individuals how the critical frailty factor de-
pends on age and tax rate and in particular how introducing tax incentives for
annuitization affects critical frailty factors.
In Section 4, we extend our analyses to a pool of individuals that is het-
erogeneous with respect to mortality. We explore how the portion of individ-
uals who should annuitize changes as we move from the old to the new tax
regime. We also analyze the effect on the insurer’s profitability. Since one find-
ing is that the heterogeneity of the value for money amongst the pool of insured
increases due to the tax incentives, we finally analyze in Section 5 the effects of
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introducing enhanced annuities. We find that in a market with enhanced annu-
ities three positive effects occur: The portion of people who should annuitize
increases, adverse selection is reduced, and the heterogeneity of the value for
money within the pool of insured decreases.
2. THE MODEL FRAMEWORK
The following analyses require the use of different types of mortality rates:Mor-
tality rates used by the insurer to price standard annuities, mortality rates used
by the insurer to price enhanced annuities, and the actual mortality rates of the
individual given his state of health. The latter rates are of course unknown to
the insurer. For all analyses throughout this paper, we use the German mortal-
ity table DAV 2004R (for males) issued by the German Actuarial Association
(Deutsche Aktuarvereinigung, DAV) as a basis and refer to this table as the
standard table.
2.1. Heterogeneity of mortality
A central aspect of our model is that we consider heterogeneity with respect to
mortality, i.e. we allow for different individuals of the same age and gender to
have different mortality rates and hence different life expectancies. To specify
this heterogeneity we use a simple frailty model for the individual mortality (cf.
e.g. Vaupel et al., 1979): each person is characterized by a so-called frailty fac-
tor or mortality multiplier d. This person’s individual mortality probabilities are
then given by d times the mortality probabilities from the standard table. A per-
son with d > 1 (d<1 respectively) has above average (below average) mortality
and thus below average (above average) life expectancy.3
For our analyses in Section 3, we look at an individual insured. There, we
analyze the impact of the frailty factor on the optimal decision to annuitize in
a model with and without tax incentives for annuitization. In Section 4, how-
ever, in order to quantify the impact on an insurer, we look at a pool of persons
with different frailty factors. There, we need to specify the distribution of frailty
factors among the population. Vaupel et al. (1979) propose that the frailty fac-
tor d in the general population should follow a Gamma distribution. Further,
Hoermann and Ruß (2008) demand that the distribution is continuous, mak-
ing possible very fine nuances in state of health and remaining life expectancy;
that its domain is positive; that the probability density function is “flat” at zero
and equal to zero for d = 0, since mortality rates near zero are unrealistic; that
the distribution is right-skewed, i.e., very high values of d can occur; and that
the expected value E(d) = 1,4 i.e., the standard mortality table describes an
“average individual. They further state that mortality rates close to zero are
unrealistic because certain accidents are inevitable. Based on these arguments,
they propose to use a (translated) gamma-distribution D with density function
f (α,β,γ )(d) = 1(α)βα (d − γ )α−1e
−(d−γ )
β for d ≥ γ, γ ∈ IR, α, β > 0, expected
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FIGURE 1: Density function of the translated gamma distribution with parameters α = 2, β = 0.25
and γ = 0.5. (Color online)
value αβ + γ , variance αβ2 and parameters α = 2, β = 0.25 and γ = 0.5. In our
analyses, we will also use this distribution. The density function is displayed in
Figure 1.
2.2. The insurance contracts
For our analyses, we consider a standard annuity and an enhanced annuity
product. We assume a lifelong fixed annuity without death benefit and without
profit participation. We also disregard any charges. We assume that, as usually
done in practice, for pricing the annuity, the insurer uses some mortality table
and some technical interest rate.
2.2.1. The standard annuity. In the case of the standard annuity, for a given
premium P (that can either be a single premium paid into an immediate annu-
ity or some amount accumulated during the accumulation phase of a deferred




k px · vk denotes the present value of an immediate annuity paying 1
unit of currency annually in advance,
• k px =
k∏
i=1
(1 − qx+i−1) is the probability of an x-year old male to survive for
another k years,
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• qx denotes the probability that an average x-year old male dies within the
next year,
• r denotes the pricing discount rate, and
• v = 11+r .
We assume that all these probabilities are taken from the standard table.
2.2.2. The enhanced annuity. The enhanced annuity is calculated analogously,
with only one difference: In pricing the annuity, the survival probabilities are
substituted by probabilities resulting from some individual underwriting. For
individual underwriting, we follow an approach also proposed by Hoermann
and Ruß (2008): We assume that the process of individual underwriting assigns
each insured an estimate d̂ of the insured’s actual (unknown) frailty factor d.
We model the result of the underwriting as a realization of a random variable D̂
and assume D and D̂ to be identically distributed. This means that there is no
systematic underwriting error, i.e., the mortality estimation of the underwriting
across the whole population is not only correct on average but also with respect
to the portion of people identified as belonging to a certain impairment range.5
Furthermore — because we wish to focus on the pure effect of introducing in-
dividual underwriting — we do not consider any safety loadings that could,
however, easily be incorporated in the model.
We assume the random variables D and D̂ to be correlated with a correla-
tion coefficient 0 ≤ ρD,D̂ ≤ 1. This correlation coefficient determines the quality
of the individual underwriting: the larger ρD,D̂, the smaller the mean deviation
between d and d̂. For a correlation of 1, we are in the case of “perfect underwrit-
ing”, where the underwriting process assigns the correct frailty factor to each
individual.
Thus, for the enhanced annuity product, the annuity amounts to Pˆ̈ax , where
ˆ̈ax =
∑ω−x
k=0 k p̂x · vk. Here, k p̂x =
∏k
i=1 (1 − d̂∗qx+i−1) is the probability of an
x-year old male to survive for another k years applying the mortality probabil-
ities resulting from the individual underwriting.6 To calculate these mortality
probabilities, the estimated frailty factor d̂ is applied to the standard table.
2.3. The considered tax regimes
Asmentioned above, Germany changed the taxation of life insurance benefits in
2005 and introduced strong tax incentives for annuitizing money that has been
accumulated within an insurance contract. We use the situation in Germany
before 2005 as our model environment without tax incentives and the situation
in Germany since 2005 as our model environment with tax incentives for annu-
itization.
The situation before 2005 was very simple. Under certain conditions (most
importantly a minimum term to maturity of 12 years), lump sum benefits from
insurance contracts were tax free. If the benefit was annuitized, then the so-
called taxable portion explained in Section 1 of each annuity payment was taxed
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at the beneficiary’s individual income tax rate. Since this taxable portion is an
approximation for the earnings after the annuity payout starts, essentially in
case of annuitization also all earnings from the accumulation period were tax
free. As a consequence, the taxation of earnings during the accumulation phase
was the same whether or not the client did annuitize.
The situation since 2005 is as follows: For lump sum benefits, under certain
conditions (most importantly a minimum term to maturity of 12 years and a
minimumage of the beneficiary), 50%of the difference between benefits received
and premiums paid are taxed at the beneficiary’s individual income tax rate. If
the conditions are not fulfilled, then 100% of this difference is taxed at a flat tax
rate of 25%. If the benefit is annuitized, the annuity is still taxed with the tax-
able portion. As a consequence, essentially all earnings from the accumulation
period are tax free if the money is annuitized but at least 50% of these earnings
are taxable if the money is taken as a lump sum. This is a rather strong tax
incentive for annuitization, in particular if a contract had significant earnings
in the accumulation phase.
In all analyses that follow in the next Sections, we assume that the relevant
criteria to qualify for the lower taxation of lump sum benefits are fulfilled.
3. ANALYSES FROM AN INDIVIDUAL’S PERSPECTIVE
In this Section, we analyze the effect of tax incentives for annuitization on an
individual in a market without enhanced annuities, i.e. the insurer has no infor-
mation about the insured’s state of health and prices the annuity according to
the formula given in section 2.2.1.
We assume that an individual has accumulated a certain amount of moneyP
during the accumulation phase of an insurance contract and now has to choose
between receiving this amount P as a lump sum benefit and annuitizing in a
standard annuity amounting to Päx independent of the insured’s health status.
Therefore, the (ex ante expected) value of the annuity payments is higher for
a healthy and lower for an impaired insured. In particular, for an insured aged
x with a certain frailty factor d(x) and a marginal tax rate τ , the present value











where k p̃x =
k∏
i=1
(1 − d(x) · qx+i−1) is the survival probability considering the
insured’s actual frailty factor, t(x) denotes the taxable portion of the annuity
(that depends only on the age of the insured when the annuity starts, see Ap-
pendix A), and r∗ denotes the discount rate (which need not coincide with the
insurer’s pricing discount rate r).
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This present value of the annuity (after tax) is the same under both the old
and the new tax regimes. If the client does not annuitize, the lump sum benefit
before taxes is of course P. Under the old tax regime without tax incentives for
annuitization, the lump sum benefit after taxes is also P (since the benefit was
paid out tax free). Under the new tax regime, the lump sum benefit after taxes is
P−0.5·(P − p)·τ , where p denotes the sumof premiums paid into the insurance
contract (since 50% of the difference between the benefit and the premiums paid
is taxed).
We now compare the lump sum benefit after taxes with the present value of
the expected annuity after taxes and calculate the so-called critical frailty factor
d∗(x). This is the factor below which the present value of the expected stream
of annuity payments after taxes exceeds the lump sum benefit after taxes, i.e. the





(1 − t(x)τ ) k p̃x (d(x))
(1 + r∗)k =
{
P “old” tax regime(




Under the old tax regime, the above equilibrium condition simplifies to




i=1 (1 − d∗(x)qx+i−1)




i=1 (1 − qx+i−1)
(1 + r)k .
Thus, the critical frailty factor depends only on the age of the insured and the
marginal tax rate. In our numerical analyses, we use r= 4% as a pricing discount
rate and r∗ = 0.75·r = 3% for calculating the present values since—due to a flat
rate taxation of 25% on interest earnings outside insurance contracts prevailing
in Germany — this would be the after tax return if the insured decided to take
the lump sum and invest it outside the insurance contract at r = 4%.
Of course, calculating the critical frailty factor in the way introduced
above— defined as the level where the money’s worth of the annuity equals one,
i.e. coincides with the lump sum benefit — implicitly assumes that the insured is
risk neutral. However, empirical analysis shows (see Mitchell et al., 1999) that
insured decide to annuitize even when the money’s worth is significantly below
one. This phenomenon can most easily be explained via risk aversion, which
generally is considered the most important motive for an individual’s insurance
demand.
In this spirit, we now additionally introduce amodification in that we assume
that individuals even annuitize at a money’s worth of 0.9, and 0.75, respectively,
considering the fact that Mitchell et al. argue that values down to 0.75 would
still be consistent with standard utility functions.
Although we do not explicitly model risk aversion, we will refer to these
modifications as cases with moderately risk averse annuitants (0.9) and strongly
risk averse annuitants (0.75).
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Therefore, we also calculated the critical frailty factors for insured with risk
aversion assuming that for the benefit of “hedging against the risk to outlive
their money”, they would annuitize if the expected present value of the annuity
cash-flow exceeds 90% (or 75%) of the corresponding lump sum benefit.
Under the new tax regime, the above equilibrium condition simplifies to



















i=1 (1 − qx+i−1)
(1 + r)k .
Thus, the critical frailty factor additionally depends on the ratio pP , i.e. the
amount of premiums paid in the accumulation period p divided by the lump
sum benefit P. The reason is that in the case of a lump sum benefit, taxes have to
be paid on 50% of the earnings in the accumulation phase, i.e. on 0.5 · (P − p),
whereas alternatively the full amount before taxes P can be annuitized. Note
that in practice, the insured typically has a variety of investment choices during
the accumulation phase and hence the premiums could earn an arbitrary return
leading to arbitrary ratios pP .
From the equilibrium condition, one can e.g. deduce that d∗(x) has to exceed






since r∗<r and hence the denominator of the left hand
side is lower than denominator of the right hand side. However, exact values of
d∗(x) as well as dependencies of d∗(x) from e.g. age, tax rate, risk aversion or
the ratio pP can only be derived numerically.
In our numerical analyses, we calculated the critical frailty factors for differ-
ent ages and tax rates assuming p = 0.25 · P, p = 0.5 · P and p = 0.75 · P. In
other words, p = 0.25 · P means that 25% of the lump sum benefit P consists of
premiums paid and 75% consists of earnings during the accumulation period.
The case p= Pwould mean that no earnings have occurred in the accumulation
period. Critical frailty factors for p=P obviously coincidewith the results under
the old tax regime.
The critical frailty factors under the old tax regime (without tax incentives
for annuitization) are shown in Figure 2 and under the new tax regime (with tax
incentives for annuitization) for different values of p in Figures 3a–3c.
In all figures, the solid lines show the critical frailty factors for a risk neutral
insured and a marginal tax rate of 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, and 45%, respectively7,
the dashed lines in themiddle show the corresponding values for an insured with
moderate risk aversion, the dashed lines on top show the corresponding values
for an insured with a strong risk aversion.
A comparison of the critical frailty factors under the new and old tax
regime lead to the obvious conclusion that the new tax regime indeed provides
a stronger incentive for annuitization: From the results presented in Figures 2
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2014.17
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 27 Nov 2018 at 06:46:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,






















25% ra(0.75) 30% ra(0.75) 35% ra(0.75) 40% ra(0.75) 45% ra(0.75)
25% ra(0.9) 30% ra(0.9) 35% ra(0.9) 40% ra(0.9) 45% ra(0.9)
25% rn 30% rn 35% rn 40% rn 45% rn  
FIGURE 2: Critical frailty factor for different ages and tax rates (25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, and 45% top to
bottom in each group of lines) under the old tax regime (solid lines: risk neutral (rn); lower dashed lines:
moderately risk averse (ra(0.9)); upper dashed lines: strongly risk averse (ra(0.75))) assuming an interest rate of




















25% ra(0.75) 30% ra(0.75) 35% ra(0.75) 40% ra(0.75) 45% ra(0.75)
25% ra(0.9) 30% ra(0.9) 35% ra(0.9) 40% ra(0.9) 45% ra(0.9)
25% rn 30% rn 35% rn 40% rn 45% rn  
FIGURE 3a: Critical frailty factor for different ages and tax rates (25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, and 45% bottom to
top in each group of lines) under the new tax regime for p = 0.25 · P (solid lines: risk neutral (rn); lower
dashed lines: moderately risk averse (ra(0.9)); upper dashed lines: strongly risk averse (ra(0.75))) assuming an
interest rate of r = 4%. (Color online)
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60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Age
25% ra(0.75) 30% ra(0.75) 35% ra(0.75) 40% ra(0.75) 45% ra(0.75)
25% ra(0.9) 30% ra(0.9) 35% ra(0.9) 40% ra(0.9) 45% ra(0.9)
25% rn 30% rn 35% rn 40% rn 45% rn  
FIGURE 3b: Critical frailty factor for different ages and tax rates (25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, and 45% bottom to
top in each group of lines) under the new tax regime for p = 0.5 · P (solid lines: risk neutral (rn); lower dashed
lines: moderately risk averse (ra(0.9)); upper dashed lines: strongly risk averse (ra(0.75))) assuming an interest





















60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Age
25% ra(0.75) 30% ra(0.75) 35% ra(0.75) 40% ra(0.75) 45% ra(0.75)
25% ra(0.9) 30% ra(0.9) 35% ra(0.9) 40% ra(0.9) 45% ra(0.9)
25% rn 30% rn 35% rn 40% rn 45% rn  
FIGURE 3c: Critical frailty factor for different ages and tax rates (25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, and 45% top to
bottom in each group of lines) under the new tax regime for p = 0.75 · P (solid lines: risk neutral (rn); lower
dashed lines: moderately risk averse (ra(0.9)); upper dashed lines: strongly risk averse (ra(0.75))) assuming an
interest rate of r = 4%. (Color online)
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and 3a–3c, we see that, under the new tax regime, the critical frailty factors are
higher than in the old tax regime, and thus more people should annuitize.
The incentive for annuitization under the new tax regime increases with in-
creasing earnings in the accumulation phase (i.e. with decreasing p). Again, this
is not surprising: If the money is not annuitized, 50 % of capital gains from
the savings period are subject to taxation. Therefore, the benefit of annuitiza-
tion (and hence critical frailty factors) increases as these gains increase (i.e. as
p decreases), all other things equal. Under the new tax regime and for lower
values of p, the annuity would even be attractive for individuals in a rather bad
state of health. For instance for p = 0.25 (Figure 3a) and a strongly risk averse
60 year old, critical frailty factors are above 5 for all tax rates, meaning that
annuitization is preferable even if an individual’s mortality rates are five times
average rates. Under the old tax regime, the corresponding critical frailty factors
(Figure 2) were between 3.3 and 3.8 (depending on the tax rate).
Still, it is worthwhile noting that even under the conditions of the former
tax regime, most values for risk neutral customers exceed one, which basically
reflects the fact that the taxable portions (given in Appendix A) underestimate
the earnings in the annuity payout phase8 and therefore already provide some
incentive for annuitization (see also Charupat and Milevsky, 2001; Richter and
Ruß, 2002 who come to similar findings for the situation in Canada). If taxable
portions were “fair” in the sense that exactly the earnings of the annuity were
taxed for an average individual (i.e. an individual with frailty factor 1), then the
solid line in Figure 2 for a tax rate of 25% would be flat at 1, since an individ-
ual with d = 1 and a tax rate of 25% would be indifferent between annuitizing
or taking the lump sum (due to the relation r∗ = 0.75 · r ). The fact that this
line in Figure 2 is decreasing in age means that the incentive resulting from the
definition of the taxable portions is decreasing in age.
Another quite obvious result is the fact that critical frailty factors, indepen-
dent of the tax regime and premium portion p, are increasing with the level
of risk aversion. In all figures shown, the critical frailty factors are always the
lowest for risk neutral individuals (solid lines). Further, critical frailty factors
for strongly risk averse individuals are always almost twice as high as for mod-
erately risk averse individuals. As the annuity hedges individual longevity risk,
risk aversion obviously strengthens the incentive to annuitize.
Under both tax regimes, critical frailty factors are decreasing in age. Under
the old tax regime, e.g., a 60-year old male with moderate risk aversion and a
tax rate of 30% should annuitize if his individual frailty factor is below 1.98. At
the age of 70, the critical frailty factor is only 1.59. There are two reasons for
this effect. First, taxable portions underestimate the expected earnings in the
annuity phase. Since these earnings are lower for higher ages (due to a shorter
life expectancy), this advantage of annuities is decreasing in age. Second, the
impact of a given frailty factor is higher for higher ages, since it is applied mul-
tiplicatively to higher base mortality rates.
Having a closer look on the effect of the tax rate on critical frailty factors,
different conclusions can be drawn. Under the old tax regime, consistent with
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our assumption of a flat tax rate being applied to capital gains outside the insur-
ance contract, the benefit of annuitization decreases with increasing individual
tax rate (which is applied to the annuity’s taxable portion). This is as expected
since the value of the annuity decreases in the tax rate whereas the value of the
lump sum is independent of the tax rate.
Under the new tax regime, however, we find a somewhat surprising effect:
Critical frailty factors are increasing in the tax rate for rather low values of p (i.e.
high gains in the accumulation phase) and decreasing in the tax rate for rather
high values of p (i.e. low gains in the accumulation phase). This is due to two
superimposing effects: On one hand, taxes have to be paid on the gains from the
accumulation phase if the lump sum is taken. This effect makes the lump sum
less valuable as the tax rate increases. On the other hand, the taxable portion of
the annuity also has to be taxed at the insured’s individual tax rate. This effect
makes the annuity less valuable as the tax rate increases. If gains in the accu-
mulation period are high (i.e. for low values of p), the first effect is dominant.
Therefore, with increasing tax rate, the value of the lump sum decreases faster
than the value of the annuity which leads to increasing critical frailty factors.
In contrast, if gains in the accumulation period are low (i.e. for high values
of p — and thus also for the old tax system that coincides with p = P), the sec-
ond effect outweighs the first and critical frailty factors decrease in the tax rate.
Therefore, the effect of an increasing tax rate in the former German taxation
framework for annuities was unambiguous. As a lump sum benefit was (under
the required conditions) not taxed at all, the ceteris paribus decreasing value of
the annuity would lead to a decrease in the critical frailty factor with increasing
tax rate. Stronger taxation thus, would set disincentives for annuitization.
Finally, we analyzed the impact of the interest rate r on our results (always
assuming r∗ = 0.75 · r ). We have calculated all values displayed in Figures 2,
3a–3c also for values of r= 2% and r= 6%, respectively and found a somewhat
interesting effect: The relation between the 15 different lines in each figure re-
mained rather stable under all interest rate scenarios. However, critical frailty
factors were significantly increasing in r. Figure 4 displays the results under the
old tax regime for r= 2%.When comparing Figures 2 and 4, we find that all crit-
ical frailty factors in Figure 4 are significantly lower. This effect results from the
fact that the taxable portions given in theGerman income tax law, do not change
when interest rates change. As explained in Section 1, these taxable portions are
meant to approximate the insured’s earnings in the annuity payout phase assum-
ing some fixed rate of interest is credited to the contract. Obviously, when actual
interest rates are very low, this approximation overestimates the “correct” earn-
ings and hence too much taxes are paid. Hence, the attractiveness of annuities
decreases and critical frailty factors decrease accordingly.
Summarizing, the results presented so far at first glance suggest that tax in-
centives for annuitization do work since they make annuitization the preferable
choice for a larger group of people.However, the analyses in the next Sectionwill
show that this comes at a price: The heterogeneity of the value for money also
increases, leading to significant redistribution effects. These distribution effects
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FIGURE 4: Critical frailty factor for different ages and tax rates (25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, and 45% top to
bottom in each group of lines) under the old tax regime (solid lines: risk neutral (rn); lower dashed lines:
moderately risk averse (ra(0.9)); upper dashed lines: strongly risk averse (ra(0.75))) assuming an interest
rate of r = 2%. (Color online)
are somewhat similar to results found by Gong and Webb (2008) for the case of
mandatory annuitization.
4. ANALYSES FOR A POOL OF INSURED
In this Section, we analyze the effect of tax incentives for annuitization on an
insurer in a market without enhanced annuities. For this purpose, we model a
heterogeneous pool of individuals. As described in Section 2, we assume the
frailty factor d in the general population to follow a Gamma distribution. We
assume that everybody with a frailty factor below the critical factor annuitizes
and everybody else does not. Of course this is somewhat oversimplifying: First,
the decision of whether or not to annuitize may also depend on other criteria
than the expected value of the annuity. For instance some insured might simply
need the money at the end of the accumulation phase to pay off a mortgage,
etc. This would have the effect that this group of insured would never annuitize
and the results of our analyses would apply for the remaining group only. Sec-
ond, although it is true that most insured do have information about their state
of health and would not annuitize if they are rather impaired, it is of course
unrealistic to assume that all insured know their exact frailty factor. Therefore,
in reality there would rather be an annuitization probability that decreases as
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TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE AND AVERAGE FRAILTY FACTORS OF INSURED WHO ANNUITIZE FOR A POOL OF INDIVIDUALS
UNDER THE OLD TAX REGIME.
Percentage of Insured who Annuitize Average d
Tax rate 25% 80.46% 0.86
Tax rate 35% 75.30% 0.84
Tax rate 45% 67.92% 0.81
frailty increases but not a “sharp” cutoff between annuitization probability 1
up to the critical frailty factor and 0 above that level.
In the following numerical analyses, we consider a pool of 65 year old male,
risk neutral annuitants with different tax rates and assumeP= 100,000.00 € and
different values for p.
We applied Monte Carlo techniques using the random number generator
“Mersenne TwisterMT19937” and the function “gsl ran gamma” of the library
“GNU Scientific Library Version 1.8“9 to “create” 10,000 individuals by draw-
ing their frailty factor from the gamma-distribution introduced in Section 2.
Where correlated gamma-distributed random variables are required, we use
a Gaussian copula and choose the correlation parameter in the copula such
that the linear correlation between the gamma-distributed random variables
achieves the desired value.
Whenever a person’s frailty factor is below the critical frailty factor, we as-
sume that the person would annuitize in the standard annuity contract intro-
duced in Section 2. Otherwise, we assume that the person would prefer the lump
sum benefit. From this, we can calculate the percentage of insured who do an-
nuitize and the average frailty factor of those who annuitize. Table 1 gives the
results under the old tax regime.
Under the new tax regime, we calculate the same values and also look at the
effect of the tax change on the insurer’s profitability due to the fact that — if
tax incentives are present — individuals with reduced life expectancy annuitize
for tax reasons. In the last column of the following table, we therefore give the
increase in percentage points of the insurer’s profitability rate (which is defined
as the money annuitized minus the present value of all the annuities paid out as
a percentage of the money annuitized).
Table 2 gives the corresponding results under the new tax regime.
First it is worth noting that the tax incentives work as intended in the sense
that the percentage of people who annuitize increases significantly. For instance,
with a tax rate of 45%, under the old tax regime only 67% of the insured should
annuitize. Under the new tax regime this percentage goes up to values between
86% and 99% depending on the considered gains from the accumulation phase.
Of course it holds independent of the tax rate that, the more people should
annuitize the higher these gains which would otherwise be taxed.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE AND AVERAGE FRAILTY FACTORS OF INSURED WHO ANNUITIZE AND INCREASE IN INSURER’S
PROFITABILITY FOR A POOL OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE NEW TAX REGIME.
Percentage of
Insured who Increase in Insurer’s
Annuitize Average d Profitability Rate
Tax rate 25% p = 0.25 · P 96.08% 0.96 1.98%
p = 0.5 · P 92.77% 0.94 1.49%
p = 0.75 · P 87.85% 0.90 0.86%
Tax rate 35% p = 0.25 · P 97.64% 0.98 2.79%
p = 0.5 · P 93.83% 0.94 2.20%
p = 0.75 · P 86.83% 0.90 1.29%
Tax rate 45% p = 0.25 · P 98.71% 0.99 3.76%
p = 0.5 · P 94.55% 0.95 3.09%
p = 0.75 · P 85.54% 0.89 1.92%
However, it has to be added that the percentage of the insured who should
annuitize in ourmodel is significantly higher than experienced inmost insurance
markets. This might be due to the fact that insurers anticipate adverse selection
in premiums, and also include loadings reflecting other expenses, which would
make “real” products less attractive than our generic product.
In the old tax framework, the average d is significantly below 1, reflecting
the well-established problem of adverse selection: If only standard annuities are
offered, insurance is particularly attractive for high risk individuals (in our case
the ones in very good health) and would not be purchased by individuals in
very poor health which decreases the average frailty factor in the portfolio of
annuitized risks.
An immediate consequence of the higher annuitization rates resulting from
the tax change is that the pool of insured becomes “more impaired”, i.e. the
average frailty factor in the pool of annuitants significantly increases. In other
words, the insurer has more low risk types in its insured portfolio. So the con-
sidered tax incentives not only work in the sense that they increase the portion
of people who annuitize, it also has the positive effect of decreasing adverse
selection effects. This has a positive impact on the insurer’s profitability as can
be seen from the last column of Table 2. On the other hand, however, this means
that, all other things equal, a portion of the tax incentives that were intended to
go to the insured actually goes to the insurer in the form of an increased profit.
(In a competitive market, of course, this advantage would be passed on to the
insured in some way, which implies there is a secondary effect induced by the
taxes, ultimately further increasing demand, cf. also Section 6).
Although we have seen that tax incentives are an effective means to signifi-
cantly increase the portion of individuals for which annuitization is preferable
and to reduce the negative effects of adverse selection on the insurer’s profitabil-
ity, tax incentives can not solve the problem that different individuals receive a
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different value for money out of annuitizing. For instance, under the new tax
regime and in the case p = 0.25 · P, a 65 year old with a tax rate of 30% should
annuitize if the frailty factor is below 1.86. An individual with a frailty factor
of 1.86 would of course get a significantly lower expected present value of the
annuity stream for the same money annuitized than an individual with a frailty
factor of, say, 0.8. So tax incentives yield the unintended side effect of stimulat-
ing demand for products that are “priced too high” for many of the individuals
ultimately purchasing them. A product with a low value for money can turn out
to be the best choice only because alternative products come with a higher tax
burden. This is undesired insofar, as healthy individuals profit from both, the
high value for money of the product (resulting from their good state of health)
and the tax benefits whilst for impaired individuals a significant portion of the
tax benefit is needed to compensate for the poor value for money of the product.
We now analyze this heterogeneity in the populationwith respect to value for
money of annuitization: For each individual, we calculate the present value of
the expected annuity cash-flow after taxes taking into account their individual
mortality probabilities. From this, we derive the following “heterogeneity coef-
ficient” which provides a measure for the heterogeneity in value for money: The
95th percentile of this present value divided by its 5th percentile. In ourmodel of a
market without enhanced annuities, this value is 1.31, meaning that the present
value of the expected annuity cash-flow for a healthy individual (represented
by the 95th percentile of this present value and thus by the 5th percentile of the
frailty factor d) exceeds the corresponding value for a rather impaired individual
(represented by the 95th percentile of the frailty factor) by 31%.
In the following Section, we analyze how the heterogeneity changes if en-
hanced annuities are introduced to the market.
5. INTRODUCING ENHANCED ANNUITIES
In this Section, we analyze how the effects observed above change in a market
where enhanced annuities are offered.
Of course, in the theoretical case of perfect underwriting when the result of
the underwriting d̂ (i.e. the estimate for the actual frailty factor d) coincides with
the actual frailty factor, basically everybodywould get the same value formoney
when annuitizing. If underwriting is less than perfect, i.e. ρD̂,D < 1, there will be
some insured for which the underwriting underestimates their frailty factor and
others for which the underwriting overestimates their frailty factor. This creates
heterogeneity with respect to the value for money.
We now assume that each insured is offered an annuity based on the insurer’s
underwriting, i.e. an annuity that is calculated with the estimated frailty factor
d̂ as described in Section 2.
As in the previous section we only consider the case of a risk neutral in-
sured, i.e. we assume that the insured does annuitize if the present value of the
expected annuity cash-flow after taxes exceeds the lump sum benefit after taxes.
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE AND AVERAGE FRAILTY FACTORS OF INSURED WHO ANNUITIZE FOR A POOL OF INDIVIDUALS
IN THE PRESENCE OF ENHANCED ANNUITIES FOR CORRELATION 1 (PERFECT UNDERWRITING).
Percentage of Insured
who Annuitize Average d
Old tax regime Tax rate 25% 100.00% 1.00
Tax rate 35% 100.00% 1.00
Tax rate 45% 98.93% 0.99
New tax regime Any combination of 100.00% 1.00
p = 0.25 · P, p = 0.5 · P,
p = 0.75 · P
and tax rate 25%, 35% or 45%.
In Tables 3 and 4, we see how the results from the previous section change in a
market with enhanced annuities assuming ρD̂,D = 1, and ρD̂,D = 0.75, respec-
tively.
We start with the result in the hypothetical case of perfect underwriting, i.e.
ρD̂,D = 1. The results for the old and new tax regime, are given in Table 3.
We can see that in the case of perfect underwriting, everybody should annu-
itize (except for the extreme case of themaximum tax rate combinedwith the old
tax regime, where still just the unhealthiest 1%of the populationwould do better
with a lump sum). So we can conclude that introducing enhanced annuities with
good quality of underwriting is a more efficient means to increase the portion of
individuals who annuitize than tax incentives. We can also see that introducing
enhanced annuities still has an additional positive effect in an economy with tax
incentives for annuitization. Since everybody annuitizes, obviously the average
frailty factor in the portfolio is 1 and there is no adverse selection.
Finally, since the pricing of the annuity perfectly reflects the individual’s state
of health, all consumers receive essentially the same (expected) value for money.
As a result, the heterogeneity coefficient drops to 1.03.10
We can conclude that in the case of perfect underwriting, enhanced annuities
are a very effective means in increasing the share of people who should annu-
itize, doing away with adverse selection and making sure that everybody gets
essentially the same value for money.
We will now consider the case where underwriting is less than perfect by
assuming that the correlation between the estimated and the actual frailty factor
is below 1. Table 4 shows the corresponding results for a correlation of 0.75.
If the underwriting is not perfect, there will be some insured where the es-
timated frailty factor is significantly lower than the actual frailty factor. In our
model, these insured would not annuitize. Therefore, less than 100% of the indi-
viduals annuitize but still significantly more than in a market without enhanced
annuities.
Of course, the imperfection of the underwriting could also go the other way,
resulting in some rather healthy persons being underwritten as impaired. In that
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE AND AVERAGE FRAILTY FACTORS OF INSURED WHO ANNUITIZE FOR A POOL OF INDIVIDUALS
IN THE PRESENCE OF ENHANCED ANNUITIES FOR CORRELATION 0.75.
Percentage of Insured
who Annuitize Average d
Old tax regime Tax rate 25% 86.47% 0.94
Tax rate 35% 78.71% 0.92
Tax rate 45% 68.55% 0.89
New tax regime Tax rate 25% p = 0.25 · P 99.34% 1.00
p = 0.5 · P 97.94% 0.99
p = 0.75 · P 94.45% 0.97
Tax rate 35% p = 0.25 · P 99.76% 1.00
p = 0.5 · P 98.47% 0.99
p = 0.75 · P 93.46% 0.96
Tax rate 45% p = 0.25 · P 99.91% 1.00
p = 0.5 · P 98.83% 0.99
p = 0.75 · P 91.89% 0.96
(small) segment, adverse selection effects could even be worse than in a market
without enhanced annuities. Therefore, while introducing enhanced annuities
with less than perfect quality of underwriting does still reduce adverse selection
effects overall, the effect is smaller than in the case of perfect underwriting. For
the same reason, the heterogeneity coefficient increases and amounts to 1.24. In
other words, the difference in value for money within the population is larger
than in the case with perfect underwriting but still smaller than in a market
without enhanced annuities (where it amounts to 1.31).
We also performed analyses for lower correlations: It is worth noting, that
under both tax regimes even for a rather low correlation of 0.5, the percentage
of insured that annuitize is at a similar level as in a market where only standard
annuities are offered. So, although introducing enhanced annuities with rather
poor underwriting quality cannot increase the share of people who annuitize,
the average frailty factor of those who do annuitize is significantly higher if en-
hanced annuities are presentmeaning that a significant share of impaired people
annuitizes in this case. Of course these are the impaired that are correctly un-
derwritten as being impaired or where the impairment is even overestimated. So
even if the overall percentage of individuals who do annuitize will not increase if
the quality of the underwriting is rather poor, we still have the positive side effect
that at least a portion of those who would get a very bad value for money from
a standard annuity would now get a fair product. This can also be seen in the
heterogeneity coefficient being (slightly) lower than without enhanced annuities.
Finally, we would like to state that as expected in the extreme case of ρD,D̂ =
0, where underwriting results fluctuate independent of the actual frailty factor,
both, selection effects and heterogeneity do increase: The heterogeneity coeffi-
cient amounts to 1.44.
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To summarize, introducing enhanced annuities can decrease selection effects,
increase the amount of peoplewho annuitize and decrease heterogeneity in value
for money, if the quality of the underwriting is good. In particular, the introduc-
tion of these products is more effective than introducing tax incentives. Even for
a mediocre quality of the underwriting, positive effects can be observed. Only if
the quality of the underwriting is rather poor, introducing enhanced annuities
will not succeed in increasing the share of individuals who do annuitize.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, employing a simple frailty model for the individual mortality, we
have analyzed the effects of introducing tax incentives for annuitization or en-
hanced annuities on an individual’s decision to annuitize and on the insurer’s
profitability.
We found that the critical frailty factor below which annuitization is prefer-
able, increases significantly if, all other things equal, tax incentives for annuiti-
zation are introduced. In other words, in the presence of tax incentives, annuiti-
zation may be preferable even if the insured is rather impaired. It has also been
shown how risk aversion increases this effect (note that in this work risk aversion
was modeled in a rather simplistic fashion as the insured’s tendency to annuitize
even at a specified value of money’s worth below one).
The interaction, however, between the tax rate and the critical frailty fac-
tor within the new framework is ambiguous. On the margin, taxation actually
might set disincentives for annuitization, when the share of accumulated gains is
rather low such that additional taxation affects the annuity more strongly than
the lump sum, resulting in a decrease in the critical frailty factor. With a high
proportion of gains, though, annuitization becomes more attractive.
When analyzing a pool of insured, we found that introducing tax incentives
for annuitization will indeed as intended increase the portion of individuals who
should annuitize. It will also significantly reduce adverse selection. However,
the problem that different insured receive a different value for money is even
increased by tax incentives which indicates that this approach to incentivizing
annuitization needs to be used very carefully as it leads to significant cross-
subsidization towards the healthy at the cost of insured in bad health.
Given these concerns, this paper addressed another approach that might im-
prove the market share of annuities: enhanced annuities. It was shown, that if
enhanced annuities are available — either instead or on top of tax incentives —
in the case of good quality of underwriting, all three targets are reached simul-
taneously: The portion of individuals who should annuitize increases dramati-
cally, adverse selection is eliminated and essentially all insured receive the same
value for money.
If, however, the quality of underwriting is rather poor, the portion of individ-
uals who should annuitize does not increase. However, adverse selection is still
reduced. The heterogeneity of the value for money increases with decreasing
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quality of underwriting, reaching the level of the case without enhanced annu-
ities at a correlation of slightly below 0.5.
These results have straightforward policy implications.While recent develop-
ments, e.g. in Germany seem to indicate that a tendency exists towards manda-
tory annuitization in some segments and tax incentives in others, our analysis
suggests that there are other potentially more efficient ways of addressing the
issue with less severe market intervention. In a market where annuitization is
mandatory, but without risk-adequate annuitization, it needs to be analyzed
carefully how this strong intervention is justified. Even if there is a welfare gain,
e.g. from reduced reliance on the state respectively social security, adverse effects
must not be overlooked. Obviously, mandatory annuitization in such an envi-
ronment creates a clear externality which favors those in good health, as they
would be subsidized by the others. The resulting welfare effects need to be kept
in mind.
On the other hand, creating a framework that incentivizes or obligates annu-
ity providers to offer enhanced annuities would provide equal or similarmoney’s
worth to all annuitants. Also our results suggest that, if done correctly, such
a policy would increase the popularity of annuitization without favoring one
group at the cost of the other. So, under these circumstances, it might not even
be necessary to make annuitization mandatory. On the other hand, however, if
annuitization ismandatory, there should also be a requirement that annuities are
provided in a risk-adequate manner, or in other words, that enhanced annuities
are offered.
The intention of this analysis was to derive the key results in a rather sim-
ple and intuitive model. Therefore, there is a wide range of possible extensions
to our model for future research. For instance, we have neglected charges and
expenses and have used a rather simplistic approach towards modeling risk
aversion. Furthermore, we have not considered the “feedback” effect between
changes in adverse selection and annuity prices. In reality, insurers would react
to stronger adverse selection (i.e. higher values of d∗) by increasing prices (i.e.
decreasing annuity payouts) and vice versa. However, considering this feedback
effect and calculating corresponding theoretical equilibrium prices would even
increase the observed effects: As we have seen in our analyses, introducing tax
incentives or enhanced annuities to a market c.p. reduces selection effects and
therefore increases the insurer’s profit. The insurer would react by reducing the
prices of annuities (i.e. annuity payouts would go up). This effect would further
increase demand leading to another increase in insurer’s profit to which the in-
surer would again react by reducing prices and so on, until some kind of equilib-
rium is reached. Analogously, abolishing tax incentives or enhanced annuities
in a market would c.p. decrease the insurer’s profit leading to an increase in
annuity prices which further reduces demand, etc. Under certain circumstances
this could even lead to a collapsing market in the spirit of Akerlof (1970), i.e.
demand would drop to essentially zero.
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NOTES
1. To be more precise: It is assumed that an individual (of either gender) of age x lives exactly
to the remaining life expectancy for a male person aged x. Then, an amount of the annuity paid up
to this life expectancy is calculated, such that the present value of this annuity (using a discount
rate of 3%) equals 1. For a 65 year old, e.g., the sum of the annuities received is 1.22. Hence 82%
of the annuities received is the money invested in the annuity (82%∗1,22 = 1) and 18% of the
annuities received is considered interest. Thus, the taxable portion for annuities starting at age
65 is set to 18%. Due to the skewed distribution of the remaining lifetime around its expectation
and due to differences between actual interest rates earned and the assumed 3%, this is merely an
approximation for the expected earnings of an annuity.
2. In substandard annuities, contrasting standard annuities, the annual payment depends on
the insured’s health status. Enhanced annuities and impaired annuities can be considered subcat-
egories of substandard annuities. These two terms are sometimes used synonymously, but more
detailed definitions characterize enhanced annuities as offering modest increases in the annuity
payments, underwritten based upon lifestyle factors and medical conditions, while impaired annu-
ities would be underwritten based upon serious health impairments such as stroke, heart attack etc.
While enhanced annuities can be underwritten using automated underwriting systems, impaired
annuities require individual assessment (see, e.g. Weinert (2006), Gatzert et al. (2009) or Richards
and Jones (2004). For the sake of our analyses, it is not necessary to distinguish between the terms
substandard annuities, enhanced annuities and impaired annuities.
3. Of course, this is simplifying. Besides impairments that result in a rather constant frailty
factor, there are impairments that result in a higher mortality for a certain number of years only.
If this period is survived, mortality is “back to normal”. For other impairments, excess mortality
(i.e. the difference between individual mortality rates and average mortality rates) might decrease
gradually. See, e.g. Carver (2009) for some examples. While it is essential to consider such effects
when performing actual underwriting, it can be neglected in the analysis of the general effects of
enhanced annuities on an insurance market.
4. Of course, since the life expectancy or the present value of an annuity are not linear in d,
E(d) = 1 does not imply, that the average life expectancy (or the average present value of an an-
nuity) in a population coincides with the life expectancy of (or present value of an annuity for) an
individual with d = 1.
5. In practice, there might be a bias due to imperfect underwriting, e.g. an unconscious under-
estimation of frailty factors because the underwriter is aware of adverse selection. Themodel could
be adjusted to allow for D and D̂ having different distributions.
6. For d̂ < 1, we substitute d̂ ·qω by 1, whereω denotes the so-called limiting age of the standard
mortality table, i.e. the age that, according to that table, will not be exceeded. Thus, any remaining
probability mass is assigned to the mortality rate of the last year. Also, for d̂ > 1, we have to
substitute d̂ · qx by 1 whenever d̂ · qx > 1.
7. The marginal tax rate currently is 0 up to an annual income of 8,004 EUR. It then grows
from 14% to 42% which is reached for an income of 52,882 EUR. For any income beyond 250,731
EUR, a marginal tax rate of 45% is applied.
8. This primarily results from the rather low assumed rate of interest of 3% when taxable por-
tions were derived, cf. Section 1.
9. Cf. http://www.gnu.org/software/gsl.
10. One might expect a value of 1.00. The deviation simply results from the fact that we assume
r∗<r.
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APPENDIX A TABLE OF TAXABLE PORTIONS
Age at Taxable Age at Taxable Age at Taxable
Annuitization Portion Annuitization Portion Annuitization Portion
0 - 1 59% 38 39% 64 19%
2 - 3 58% 39 - 40 38% 65 - 66 18%
4 - 5 57% 41 37% 67 17%
6 - 8 56% 42 36% 68 16%
9 - 10 55% 43 - 44 35% 69 - 70 15%
11 - 12 54% 45 34% 71 14%
13 - 14 53% 46 - 47 33% 72 - 73 13%
15 - 16 52% 48 32% 74 12%
17 - 18 51% 49 31% 75 11%
19 - 20 50% 50 30% 76 - 77 10%
21 - 22 49% 51 - 52 29% 78 - 79 9%
23 - 24 48% 53 28% 80 8%
25 - 26 47% 54 27% 81 - 82 7%
27 46% 55 - 56 26% 83 - 84 6%
28 - 29 45% 57 25% 85 - 87 5%
30 - 31 44% 58 24% 88 - 91 4%
32 43% 59 23% 83 - 93 3%
33 - 34 42% 60 - 61 22% 94 - 96 2%
35 41% 62 21% ab 97 1%
36 - 37 40% 63 20%
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